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I. INTRODUCTION
N 2010, the American Law Institute (ALI) and the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) approved
several amendments to the Official Text of Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code on secured transactions.' These amendments, with a
few non-uniform changes, were adopted in Texas during the 2011 legisla-
tive session with an effective date of July 1, 2013.2 This article discusses
* Professor of Law and Foundation Professor of Commercial Law, Texas Tech Uni-
versity. B.A., J.D., University of Iowa; LL.M. Harvard University.
1. Nat'l Conference of Comm'ns on Unif. State Laws, Amendments to Uniform Com-
mercial Code Article 9, THE AM. L. INST., http://www.ali.org/00021333/UCC9%20amend-
ments%202010%20-%20final%20text.pdf (last visited February 17, 2012).
2. The amendments were introduced in the 2011 legislative session as companion bills
HB 1617 and SB 782. As finally approved, the House substituted SB 782 in lieu of HB
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several of these amendments as well as a number of cases decided during
the Survey period.
II. SALE OF GOODS
A. CONTRACT FORMATION
Although Chapter 2 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code (the
Code) contains a number of provisions directed specifically at contracts
for the sale of goods, it is built on a common law framework.3 Section
2.204 on contract formation is one of the instances in which common law
principles are used to supplement the Code.4 J.D. Fields & Co., Inc. v.
United States Steel International, Inc. is a good example of the interaction
1617, and it was signed by the Governor on May 17, 2011. See Tex. S.B. 782, 82nd Leg.,
R.S. (2011), available at http://www.legis.state.tx.us/BillLookup/Text.aspx?LegSess=82R&
Bill=SB782 (showing effective date of July 1, 2013); Uniform Law on Secured Transactions,
82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 67, §§ 1-20, 2011 Tex. Sess. Law. Serv. ch. 67 (West) (to be codified as
an amendment to TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. ch. 9). The effective date of July 1, 2013
was deliberately chosen by ALl and NCCUSL as a uniform effective date to allow time for
all states to consider legislative action on the amendments. The Texas version of the Uni-
form Commercial Code appears as the first eleven chapters in the Texas Business and
Commerce Code (the Code). See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.101-11.108 (West
2009). It should be noted that the Code became effective in Texas on July 1, 1966 as a
separate statute. See Uniform Commercial Code, 59th Leg., R.S., Ch. 721, §§ 1.101-10.105,
1965 Tex. Gen. Laws 1. It was reenacted in 1967 as part of the Business & Commerce
Code, the first of the codes promulgated under the Texas Codification Act. Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 61st Leg., R.S., Ch. 785, §§ 1-6, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 2343. In that process,
the designation of "Article" in the Official Text was changed to "Chapter," subsections
were designated by letters rather than numbers, and a period instead of a dash was used to
designate sections. Thus, for example, § 2-204(1) in the Official Text became § 2.204(a) in
the Texas codification. Revisions of the Code that have taken place since 1967 still substi-
tute "Chapter" for "Article," and a period instead of a dash, but now use the Official Text
system for designating subsections. See, e.g., Act of Jan. 1, 1996, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 921,
§ 1, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law. Serv. ch. 921 (West) (codified at TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§§ 3.101-.805 (West 2011)). As currently enacted, Chapter 2 is the only chapter of the
Code that retains the older non-uniform system to designate subsections. In the grand
scheme of things, this is a minor point, but it can be confusing when doing Code research
and in correlating the text of the Official Comments (which have not been adopted in
Texas as part of the Code itself) to the statutory provisions. It can also affect searching on
Westlaw and Lexis if the searcher is trying to track case interpretations of particular sec-
tions of the Code because of the variation in section and subsection designations over the
years. Note 3, infra, contains an example of how this disparity can sometimes be confusing.
3. Several sections of Chapter 2 contain provisions directed specifically at transac-
tions involving the sale of goods that differ from, or are inappropriate for, non-goods trans-
actions. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.207 (differing terms in offer and
acceptance), 2.305 (open price terms), 2.307-.308 (delivery terms), 2.314-315 (warranties
of merchantability and fitness for particular purpose), 2.319-.321 (shipment terms),
2.601-.602 (right and manner of rejection), 2.705 (right to stop delivery in transit) (West
2009).
4. Section 2.204(a) provides, "A contract for sale of goods may be made in any man-
ner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the
existence of such a contract." The Official Comment to this section notes that "Subsection
(1) continues without change the basic policy of recognizing any manner of expression of
agreement, oral, written or otherwise. The legal effect of such an agreement is, of course,




between the Code and the common law.5 In Fields, a seller of steel sent
two separate price quotations to a prospective buyer. One of the quota-
tions was sent in response to an inquiry from the prospective buyer and
contained detailed information about the product, the quantity, the price,
the payment terms, the manufacturing and delivery schedule, and an ex-
plicit statement that the terms would be valid for only fourteen days. The
quotation did not, however, contain shipping terms, the method of ship-
ping, or legal terms and conditions. Within five days, the prospective
buyer sent a purchase order mirroring the terms of the quotation. The
other price quotation contained similar terms, but the buyer did not re-
spond to this quotation for more than fourteen days, and when the
purchase order was finally sent, it stated a different quantity term. The
seller did not acknowledge either purchase order and eventually notified
the prospective buyer that it would not fill either of them.
The prospective buyer sued the seller for breach of contract. The prin-
cipal issue turned on whether the prospective buyer was reasonable in
believing the price quotations were offers that had been accepted by the
purchase orders to form a contract. The seller moved for summary judg-
ment and the district court ruled in favor of the seller on both claims.6
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit discussed the
interplay between the Code and the common law-citing Code provi-
sions, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, and several prior cases-in
reaching a conclusion that a price quotation could constitute an offer if it
was sufficiently detailed and did not limit the method of acceptance. 7
The court held that the prospective buyer could have reasonably believed
that the detailed price quotation was an offer that had been accepted by
sending a purchase order within the specified time.8 It therefore reversed
the determination as to the price quotation containing detailed terms to
which the buyer had timely responded with a purchase order mirroring
those terms, but affirmed summary judgment in favor of the seller on the
other purchase order claim. 9
Tricon Energy, Ltd. v. Vinmar International, Inc. addressed the ques-
tion of whether a proposed contract modification was effective to add an
arbitration clause to a contract. 10 The issue arose because an email sent
by the seller proposing the modification contained signature blocks for
both parties. The buyer responded with an assenting email, but neither
the buyer nor the seller ever signed the signature blocks. The buyer ar-
gued that the modification never became effective because of the lack of
5. J.D. Fields & Co., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Int'l, Inc., 426 F. App'x 271, 276 (5th Cir.
2011). The district court decision in this case was discussed in last year's Survey. See John
Krahmer, Commercial Transactions, 64 SMU L. REV. 153, 157-58 (2011).
6. J.D. Fields & Co., Inc., 426 F. App'x at 272.
7. Id. at 275-81.
8. Id. at 280.
9. Id. at 278, 280-81.
10. Tricon Energy, Ltd. v. Vinmar Int'l, Ltd., No. 4:10-cv-05260, 2011 WL 4424802, at
*1 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2011).
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signature. The court disagreed.11 Citing, inter alia, the Fields case de-
scribed above, the Federal District Court for the Southern District of
Texas reasoned that the seller's email should be viewed as an offer that
was accepted when the buyer returned an email agreeing to the modifica-
tion.12 As to the lack of signatures, the court held that the terms of the
sales contract indicated that the parties did not contemplate formal sign-
ing as a condition to contract formation because of industry practice and
the language contained in the sales contract itself.13 The court also noted
that section 1.201(b)(37) of the Code allows electronic "signing" of docu-
ments, and by typing their names at the bottom of the emails the parties
had effectively signed the documents without the need to add a tradi-
tional written signature in the signature blocks.14 The court held that the
proposed modification to add an arbitration clause had become a part of
the contract.1 5
While contracts for the sale of goods are often formed by an exchange
of communications, an enforceable contract may also be formed by the
acts of a party. In United Galvanizing, Inc. v. Imperial Zinc Corp., a
buyer placed an order for zinc to be used in a galvanizing process. 16 The
seller made arrangements to supply the zinc through another company.
Upon delivery, the buyer used one-half of the zinc in its galvanizing kettle
and discovered that it contained too much aluminum to be suitable for
galvanizing. The buyer then sued the seller for breach of contract and for
damages caused to its galvanizing kettle. The seller counterclaimed for
payment for the zinc that was used. The principal issues in the case
turned on whether the seller had supplied zinc that conformed to the con-
tract terms and whether the buyer's use of part of the shipment consti-
tuted acceptance of the goods.
A conversation that took place between the seller and the buyer prior
to placement of the buyer's order indicated that they discussed variations
in the grade of "Prime Western" zinc and "remelt" zinc and the relation-
ship of these types of zinc to the standards of the American Society of
Testing Materials (ASTM) for zinc to be used in a galvanizing process.
When the buyer eventually placed its order by email, it did not specify
that the zinc was to be "Prime Western" zinc conforming to the ASTM B
6 standard. A confirming email sent by the seller referred to the zinc as
11. Id. at *8-10.
12. Id. at *8. In the buyer's email response, it stated that the seller's proposal was
accepted except for a proposal to change the time period for demurrage charges. The
court viewed this response as "assent to the un-objected to additional terms in the sales
contract." Id. at *9.
13. Id. at *10.
14. Id. at *11. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 1.201(b)(37) allows parties to sign a docu-
ment by "using any symbol executed or adopted with present intention to adopt or accept
a writing." TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(b)(37) (West 2009). The court reasoned
that by typing their names in the emails, the parties showed an intent to adopt the modifi-
cation. Id.
15. Tricon Energy, Ltd., 2011 WL 4424802, at *12.
16. United Galvanizing, Inc. v. Imperial Zinc Corp., No. H-08-0551, 2011 WL 11185, at
*I (S.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2011).
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"remelt" zinc and did not represent that it conformed to the ASTM B 6
standard. The bill of lading also referred to the delivered zinc as "remelt"
zinc. Based on the exchange of emails, and on the buyer's use of the zinc
despite the lack of any indication that it conformed to the ASTM stan-
dard, the court held that a contract had been formed. 17 Furthermore, the
emails and the buyer's use of the zinc created a contract that satisfied the
Code's Statute of Frauds. 18 The buyer argued that even though it had not
rejected the goods upon delivery, it was entitled to revoke acceptance
because of nonconformity. The Federal District Court for the Southern
District of Texas rejected this argument on the ground that the goods did
conform to the contract terms since none of the contract documents re-
quired the zinc to meet the ASTM B 6 standard. 19 The court concluded
that the seller was not liable for any damages suffered by the buyer and
that the buyer was required to pay for the zinc that had been used.
20
B. WARRANTIES
Facts giving rise to a breach of warranty claim under the Code often
give rise to other claims as well, such as negligence, fraud, strict liability
in tort, and violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act
(DTPA).2 1 Woodhouse v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLC is one example of
such a case. 22 In Woodhouse, the plaintiff sought help in treating her
insomnia. Her physician gave her a sample box of Ambien, a medication
available by prescription for conditions of insomnia. The plaintiff alleged
that the medication caused her to "sleepwalk" and, in that condition, she
drove and wrecked her car and was injured. She sued the manufacturer
for negligence, strict liability, breach of implied and express warranties,
fraud, and violation of the DTPA. Of particular interest for purposes of
the breach of warranty claims, the court pointed out that claims for
breach of an implied warranty of merchantability require the sale or lease
of a product to a purchaser.2 3 In this case, the plaintiff did not purchase
or lease the medication, but instead she was given a sample of the prod-
uct. Thus, the plaintiff failed to plead all of the necessary elements for a
17. Id. at *10-12.
18. Id. The Code Statute of Frauds appears in Section 2.201 of Texas Business and
Commerce Code. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.201 (West 2009). In addition to the
usual provisions dealing with contracts signed by the party against whom enforcement is
sought, a separate provision provides that the Statute may be satisfied when goods have
been "received and accepted." See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.201(c)(3) (West
2009).
19. United Galvanizing, Inc., 2011 WL 11185, at *11.
20. Id. at *12.
21. Numerous cases can be found in which some combination of these claims have
been asserted. An overview of the relationship between these claims may be found in John
Krahmer, 12 TEXAS PRACTICE: METHODS OF PRACTICE § 25.51 (3d ed. 2005 & Supp.
2011). Claims under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA) are frequently as-
serted because that Act includes a provision allowing DTPA actions for breach of war-
ranty. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(2) (West 2011).
22. Woodhouse v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLC, No. EP-11-CV-113-PRM, 2011 WL
3666595, at *1 (W.D. Tex. June 23, 2011).
23. Id. at *4.
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claim of breach of implied warranty.24 As to the breach of express war-
ranty claim, the court reached a similar result because one of the ele-
ments of that claim requires the plaintiff to be a buyer of the product. 25
Here, again, the plaintiff was not a buyer because the medication had
been given to her.26 The claim brought for a violation of the DTPA was
also dismissed, but the grounds were slightly different because the DTPA
requires only that the plaintiff be a "consumer" who "seeks or acquires
by purchase or lease, any goods or services."'27 In her petition, the plain-
tiff neither sought nor acquired the medication by purchase or lease. The
Federal District Court for the Western District of Texas granted the de-
fendant's motion to dismiss all claims. 28
Unless disclaimed, the Code provides that every sale of goods by a
merchant includes an implied warranty of merchantability. 29 An issue
not addressed by the Code is whether used goods, as well as new goods,
can include a warranty of merchantability when they are sold by a
merchant seller. In Shows v. Man Engines & Components, Inc., a buyer
purchased a yacht from an engine manufacturer's subsidiary with knowl-
edge that both the yacht and its engines were used.30 A major engine
failure occurred and the buyer sued the manufacturer. 31 Several Texas
courts of appeals cases have held that the Code implies no warranty of
merchantability in the sale of used goods.32 The plaintiff argued that this
rule should no longer apply as shown by Texas Supreme Court decisions
dealing with actions for breach of implied warranties of habitability and
the assignability of claims under the DTPA.33 The Houston Court of Ap-
peals rejected this argument on the ground that those cases did not ad-
dress the issue of merchantability under the Code and referred, instead,
24. Id.
25. Id. at *6-7.
26. Id.
27. Id. at *6; TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4) (West 2011).
28. Woodhouse, 2011 WL 3666595, at *7. The negligence, strict liability, and fraud
claims were dismissed on various grounds dealing with tort law that go beyond the scope of
this article.
29. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §2.314 (West 2009). Although this section defines
the elements of "merchantability" in some detail, it is sufficient to note that the term gen-
erally requires that goods be of fair, average quality and such that they would pass without
objection in the trade.
30. Shows v. Man Engines & Components, Inc., No. 14-09-00895-CV, 2011 WL
4793764, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 11, 2011); reh'g granted, 364 S.W.3d
348 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.).
31. Id. The yacht itself was a 1988 model. The engines had been replaced in 2000.
The sale of the yacht with the replaced engines took place in 2002. Thus, both the yacht
and the engines were "used" at the time plaintiff purchased the yacht.
32. See, e.g., Bren-Tex. Tractor Co., Inc. v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 97 S.W.3d 155, 159
n.8 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.); Bunting v. Fodor, 586 S.W.2d 144,
145-46 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, no writ); Chaq Oil Co. v. Gardner
Mach. Corp., 500 S.W.2d 877, 878 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ.).
33. Shows, 2011 WL 4793764, at *3. The cases cited by the plaintiff were Gupta v.
Ritter Homes, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 168, 168-69 (Tex. 1983) (warranty of habitability would
extend from builder to both the original purchaser and to a subsequent purchaser of a
home) and PPG Indus., Inc. v. JMB/Houston Ctrs. Partners Ltd. P'ship, 146 S.W.3d 79(Tex. 2004) (distinguishing warranties on homes from warranties on goods).
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to the earlier line of cases decided in the courts of appeals.34 The court
held that it was bound by these authorities unless they were abrogated by
a supreme court decision or by an en banc ruling by the deciding court. 35
The lower court judgment granting a take-nothing judgment against the
plaintiff was affirmed. 36
C. REVOCATION OF ACCEPTANCE
In Hull v. South Coast Catamarans, L.P., the buyer of a boat discov-
ered cracks, dents, and small holes in the fiberglass. 37 The buyer notified
the seller about the defects and had the boat examined by a fiberglass
technician. The technician estimated that it would cost three to four
thousand dollars just to determine the extent of the problems with the
fiberglass. The seller offered to make repairs or to replace the boat, but
the buyer refused this offer and demanded a full refund and reimburse-
ment for costs incurred in connection with the boat. The seller refused
and the buyer sued. After a fairly convoluted series of motions, discovery
issues, and an assignment to a visiting judge, summary judgment was
granted in favor of the seller. On appeal, the principal Code issue was
whether the plaintiff had given effective notice of revocation to avoid the
bar rule in section 2.607(c)(1) of the Code.38 After reviewing the sum-
mary judgment record, the Houston First Court of Appeals held that the
buyer had given proper notice to the seller and that issues of material fact
existed as to whether the buyer provided an opportunity for the seller to
cure the defects. 39 The court added that, even if notice had not been
given as required by the Code, this would only bar the plaintiff from re-
covering on his Code claims and would not bar claims for negligence,
negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, and non-warranty claims
based on violations of the DTPA because these claims sought remedies
34. Shows, 2011 WL 4793764, at *3.
35. Id.
36. Id. at *5. The author has noted elsewhere that the issue of whether a warranty of
merchantability should be implied in the sale of used goods should be re-examined because
Chaq Oil Co. v. Gardner Mach. Corp., the seminal case on this issue, merely relied on pre-
Code cases as controlling precedent without analyzing the provisions of Tex. Bus. & Com.
Code § 2.314 or its Official Comment, and subsequent decisions have uncritically followed
the lead of Chaq Oil. See John Krahmer, Commercial Transactions, 37 S.W. L.J. 145,
150-52 (1983). One would hope that a supreme court case or an en banc decision would
revisit this issue for an analytical determination of whether implied warranties might ap-
propriately be imposed in at least some sales of used goods. As noted more than one
hundred years ago by Justice Holmes, "It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of
law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists
from blind imitation of the past." Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV.
L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
37. Hull v. S. Coast Catamarns, L.P., 365 S.W.3d 35 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.]
2011, pet denied).
38. Id. at 44. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 2.607(c)(1) provides that a "buyer must within
a reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered any breach notify the seller
of breach or be barred from any remedy." TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.607(c)(1)
(West 2009).
39. Hull, 365 S.W.3d at 45.
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outside of the Code.40 The summary judgment was reversed and the case
remanded for trial.41
D. REMEDIES
Section 2.709 of the Code is titled "Action for the Price. '42 This title
can engender some confusion because it sounds as if it were a generic
remedy for any breach of contract by a buyer. In fact, the remedy is quite
limited. It applies only when risk of loss has passed to the buyer, when
the buyer has accepted the goods, or when the goods cannot be resold.43
Two examples will explain both the limitation and the operation of this
section. Suppose Buyer orders a case of copy paper from Seller, a paper
distributor. Seller has hundreds of cases of this paper available. Before
the case of paper is sent to Buyer, Buyer calls Seller and cancels the or-
der. Because the case of paper could be resold to other buyers and the
risk of loss had not passed to Buyer in the course of shipping the paper,
Seller would not be entitled to sue Buyer for the price of the paper, but
would instead be limited to recovering the difference between the con-
tract price and the going market price for this paper (probably zero) or,
alternatively, the profit lost by Seller on this contract, i.e., the difference
between the price Seller paid for the paper and the price charged to
Buyer (probably only a few cents or, at most, only a few dollars for one
case of paper).44
Contrast this case with one in which Buyer orders 1000 menus for
Buyer's restaurant from Seller, a printing company. Seller prints the 1000
menus, using a case of paper in the process. Before the menus are deliv-
ered to Buyer, Buyer cancels the order. In this situation, it is unlikely
that the menus can be sold to another buyer because they are uniquely
suitable for Buyer's restaurant (unless Buyer's restaurant has a remarka-
bly limited menu selection). In this case, Seller could hold the goods for
the buyer and maintain an action for the price. Between these extremes,
a situation may be more complex if a buyer has ordered goods that are
specially manufactured for the buyer (like the restaurant menus) and, af-
ter the seller has begun the manufacturing process but before it has been
completed, the buyer cancels the order. The Code provides for this situa-
tion by allowing the seller, using reasonable commercial judgment, to
stop manufacture and sell the partially finished goods for scrap or sal-
vage, to complete the process and resell the goods, or treat the goods as a
product that is suitable only for this buyer and maintain an action for the
price.45 Part of the seller's decision may be based on whether the seller
has already entered into contracts with third parties that would expose
the seller to liability if the seller were to cancel those contracts as a result
40. Id. at 45.
41. Id. at 45.
42. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.709 (West 2009).
43. See id. at Official Comment 2.
44. See id. § 2.708.
45. See id. § 2.704.
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of the buyer's cancellation. This could occur if, for example, the menus
ordered by Buyer were to be printed on special paper that Seller had
ordered before learning of Buyer's cancellation. If Seller could not can-
cel the paper order without liability, this would be a factor to consider in
making a decision to stop or to continue manufacture.
This situation arose in Barrington Group, Limited, Inc. v. Classic Cruise
Holdings S DE RL, where a buyer ordered several lots of gifts and pro-
motional items to be distributed to cruise ship passengers. 46 The buyer
eventually cancelled two of the orders, but the seller completed the or-
ders and sued the buyer for the price. The trial court held that the seller's
decision was commercially reasonable. 47 On appeal, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed, noting that the seller had become
obligated to third parties for the purchase of various articles to be used in
manufacturing the items, and it was clear that the products would not be
suitable for sale to others, particularly because they would have little or
no value after the scheduled cruise ships sailed.48 The court rejected an
argument by the buyer that the seller's evidence failed to adequately
show that the seller was obligated to the third parties.49 Judgment in
favor of the seller was affirmed.50
Under the Code, if a seller breaches a contract for the sale of goods,
the buyer is, of course, entitled to recover for the breach. 51 Unless the
action is one for specific performance, the critical question then becomes
one of calculating a dollar amount that will compensate the buyer for the
seller's breach. As a general rule, the Code permits a buyer to recover
any damages resulting directly from the breach, e.g., the difference be-
tween the contract price and the market price or the amount the buyer
had to pay to obtain comparable goods.52 If the action is one for breach
of warranty, the buyer's recovery is based on the difference in value be-
tween the goods accepted and the value the goods should have had if they
had been as warranted.5 3 Under any of these formulations, the buyer
may also be entitled to recover incidental or consequential damages re-
sulting from the breach.5 4 It is not uncommon, however, for a seller to
insist upon a contractual limitation of liability to prevent recovery of con-
46. Barrington Group, Ltd., Inc. v. Classic Cruise Holdings S DE RL, 435 F. App'x
382, 383 (5th Cir. 2011). An earlier decision in this case involving application of the statute
of frauds was discussed in the 2011 Survey. See John Krahmer, supra note 5, at 158-59.
47. Barrington Group, Ltd., Inc., 435 F. App'x at 383.
48. Id. at 385-86.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 386.
51. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.711 (West 2009).
52. Id. § 2.713 (containing the provisions dealing with recovery of the contract/market
difference). Id. § 2.712 (stating the rules to be applied when the buyer purchases compara-
ble goods to "cover" for the seller's breach).
53. See id. § 2.714.
54. See id. § 2.715. Incidental damages include such miscellaneous items as expenses
incurred in the inspection, receipt, care and custody of rejected goods, costs of obtaining
cover, and other reasonable expenses associated with the breach. Consequential damages
include losses "resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which the
seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which could not reasonably be
20121
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sequential damages where such damages may greatly exceed the value of
the goods themselves. 55 If a contract excludes or limits recovery of con-
sequential damages, a determination must then be made of which dam-
ages are damages directly resulting from the breach and which damages
are consequential damages. This was the issue addressed by the Houston
First Court of Appeals in Powell Electrical Systems, Inc. v. Hewlett Pack-
ard Company.56 In Powell Electrical, an electrical contractor was hired to
repair a transformer at a manufacturing plant. The contract excluded re-
covery of consequential damages. During the repair process, breaker
cables connected to the transformer were removed and unintentionally
crossed when they were reconnected. The crossing of the breaker cables
caused damage to one of the two transformers in the factory resulting in
costs to the manufacturer for repair of the damaged transformer and for a
temporary replacement transformer. The manufacturer sued to recover
all of these costs. At trial, the jury found in favor of the manufacturer on
its breach of contract and breach of warranty claims and the trial court
granted judgment on the verdict after allowing for an offset and interest.
On appeal, the repair company contended that all of the damages were
consequential damages for which recovery was barred under the contract.
After reviewing earlier decisions discussing the difference between di-
rect damages and consequential damages, the court of appeals reasoned
that damages that are "conclusively presumed to have been foreseen or
contemplated" are direct damages, while damages that "result naturally,
but not necessarily, from the breach" are consequential damages. 57 Ap-
plying this standard to the case at bar, the court reasoned that it could
have been conclusively foreseen that crossing the breakers when the
transformer was reconnected would cause damage to the transformer.5 8
These damages were, therefore, direct damages resulting from the defen-
dant's breach.5 9 According to the court, however, the cost of renting a
replacement transformer was not a cost that could have been conclusively
foreseen because the factory could operate for a period of time with only
prevented by cover or otherwise ...." Consequential damages also include "injury to
person or property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty." Id.
55. Limitations of liability are permitted in Section 2.719 of Texas Business and Com-
merce Code. Id. § 2.719. Consequential damages may be limited or excluded under this
section unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. If the contract is one for the
sale of consumer goods, limitation of consequential damages is prima facie unconscionable.
See id.
56. Powell Elec. Sys., Inc. v. Hewlett Packard Co., 356 S.W.3d 113 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.).
57. Id. at 117. The problem of distinguishing between direct damages and consequent-
ial damages has been a concern in several recent cases decided by the Houston Court of
Appeals. See, e.g., Wolf Hollow I, L.P. v. El Paso Mktg., L.P., 329 S.W.3d 628, 636-37 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010) rev'd, No. 11-0059, 2012 WL 2161545 (Tex. June 15,
2012); Cherokee Cnty. Cogeneration Partners, L.P. v. Dynegy Mktg. and Trade, 305
S.W.3d 309, 313-14 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.); Tenn. Gas Pipeline
Co. v. Technip USA Corp., No. 01-06-00535-CV, 2008 WL 3876141, *1, *3 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 21, 2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
58. Powell Elec. Sys., Inc., 356 S.W.3d at 119.
59. Id. at 120.
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one transformer. 60 In fact, the parties had anticipated such operation be-
cause the contract itself contemplated continued operation of the factory
with one transformer while repair work progressed on the other trans-
former.61 The need for a temporary replacement, therefore, may have
been a natural, but not a necessary result, of the breach.62 As such, the
cost of the temporary replacement was a consequential damage that was
not recoverable under the terms of the contract.63
Another part of the decision dealt with the recovery of attorney's fees
by the manufacturer. After concluding that the amount of attorney's fees
had not been adequately proven, the court affirmed the judgment of the
trial court after subtracting the cost of renting and installing a replace-
ment transformer and remanded the case for trial on the issue of recover-
able attorney's fees.64
It is of particular note that the Texas Supreme Court may provide addi-
tional guidance on the distinction between direct damages and conse-
quential damages since a petition for review has been granted in Wolf
Hollow I, L.P. v. El Paso Marketing, L.P.,65 another case decided by the
Houston Court of Appeals on this point, but not cited or discussed in
Powell Electrical.
Michael Smith Custom Clothier, Inc. v. Constantini also concerned a
limitation of liability.66 This case arose out of a transaction in which a
customer placed an order for custom-made shirts with a clothing com-
pany. When the shirts were delivered, they fit improperly and the cus-
tomer called the store about the problem approximately sixty days after
the order was placed. Neither this call, nor a series of subsequent phone
conversations with sales personnel at the store and with a representative
at company headquarters, resolved the dispute. The customer ultimately
returned the shirts and asked for a refund which the store denied. The
customer prevailed at trial on claims for breach of warranty, violation of
the DTPA, and negligence. 67
On appeal, the issue revolved around interpretation of the limitation of
liability provisions in the contract. A guarantee provided by the company
stated, in part, that "[cilothing made to your measurements and styling, is
non-refundable ... If you have issues with your order, they need to be
addressed within 120 days of when the order was placed. '68 The same





64. Id. at 122. The court was able to precisely determine the costs of renting and
installing a temporary transformer because the jury had returned a verdict on special issues
specifying each element of damage claimed by the manufacturer. See id. at 116.
65. Wolf Hollow I, L.P., 329 S.W.3d at 628. Wolf Hollow was discussed in the 2011
Survey. See Krahmer, supra note 5, at 162-64.
66. Michael Smith Custom Clothier v. Constantini, No. 14-09-01089-CV, 2011 WL
826350, at *4 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] March 10, 2011, no pet.).
67. Id. at *1.
68. Id. at *4-5.
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the order was placed. The company asserted that it was not liable to the
customer on any of the claims. Although the Houston Court of Appeals
agreed that section 2.719 of the Code permits limitations of liability, the
court also noted that the contract terms themselves were the best indica-
tion of the parties' intent in defining the scope of any limitation.69 Apply-
ing the language in the contract to the evidence presented at trial, the
court held that the clothing had not been made to the customer's mea-
surements. 70 The company also argued that the one phone call made by
the customer within 120 days after the order was placed was not sufficient
to "address" the problem as required by the contract terms. The court
disagreed with this narrow interpretation of the word address and held
that the phone call gave the store adequate notice that a problem ex-
isted. 71 Judgment was affirmed in favor of the customer.72
III. LEASES OF GOODS
A. LEASE OR SALE?
An interesting statute of limitations case was litigated in Prestige Ford
Limited Partnership v. Morales, where a consumer signed a five-year
lease contract for a car but allegedly did so in the belief that she was
buying the car rather than leasing it.73 At the end of the lease term, she
was unable to pay for or finance the purchase of the vehicle and returned
it to the dealer. The car was later sold at auction and the consumer sued
for breach of contract. In an attempt to avoid the statute of limitations,
she argued that she was unaware that the contract she had signed was a
lease contract and not a sales contract until one month before the end of
the lease term. She alleged that this lack of knowledge on her part was
caused by the dealer's fraudulent concealment of the nature of the trans-
action, and she asked for a return of the payments she had made on a
theory of promissory estoppel because the dealer had represented the
transaction as a sale. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff on the prom-
issory estoppel claim, and the trial court entered judgment on the verdict
after allowing the dealer a credit for amounts owed by the consumer for
excessive use of the vehicle. 74
On appeal by the dealer, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a prom-
issory estoppel claim begins to run when a promise is breached and not
69. Id. at *4.
70. Id. at *5.
71. Id. at *5-6. The court characterized the store's interpretation of "address" as im-
posing a duty on the customer to take further action with respect to the problems with the
shirts. On this point, the court stated, "The policy itself, however, only requires that any
issues 'be addressed' within 120 days; it does not expressly or implicitly require that all
issues be resolved or even that significant progress be made toward resolution. Accord-
ingly, the trial court did not err in concluding that [the customer] complied with store
policy by notifying [the store] of the problem with the shirts within 120 days." Id.
72. Id. at *8.
73. Prestige Ford Ltd. P'ship v. Morales, 336 S.W.3d 833, 834 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2011,
no pet.).
74. Id. at 835.
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when the promisee learns of the breach.75 In this case, the dealer prom-
ised to sell the consumer a car in August of 1999, but had her sign a lease
instead of a sales contract. Under section 2A.103(10) of the Code, the
signed lease gave the consumer a right to possession and use of the vehi-
cle for a five-year period, but it did not transfer title to her.76 The breach
of the promise to sell, therefore, took place in 1999 and not in 2004 when
the consumer learned that she had not purchased the car, but had leased
it instead. 77 When suit was filed in 2006, the claim fell well beyond the
four-year limitation period and was, therefore, time-barred.78 The court
held that the dealer was entitled to judgment as a matter of law and re-
versed the decision of the trial court.79
IV. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
A. NEGOTIABLE OR NON-NEGOTIABLE?
Section 3.104 of the Code states the formal requirements needed to
make an instrument a negotiable instrument under Chapter 3. 80 Unless
the instrument meets these requirements, it is non-negotiable and falls
outside the scope of Chapter 3.81 In Guniganti v. Kalvakuntla, a determi-
nation of negotiability was critical to the outcome.82 If the note was ne-
gotiable, it would be governed by the six-year limitations period in
section 3.118; if non-negotiable, it would be governed by the four-year
75. Id. at 837.
76. Id. at 838-39. The Texas Business and Commerce Code provides, in part, "'Lease'
means a transfer of the right to possession and use of goods for a term in return for consid-
eration .... " TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2A.103(10) (West 2009).
77. Prestige Ford, 336 S.W.3d at 839.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.104 (West Supp. 2011). Although the statutory
language in § 3.104 is quite detailed, the basic requirements are: (1) the instrument must be
payable to order or to bearer; (2) the instrument must be payable on demand or at a
definite time; and (3) the instrument must not contain any promises except a promise or an
order to pay a fixed amount of money unless an additional promise is one of those listed in
§ 3.104(a)(3).
81. Chapter 3 does not, itself, state what law should govern if an instrument is found to
be non-negotiable. The Official Comment to Section 3.104 of the Texas Business and
Commerce Code does, however, offer some guidance by stating:
An order or promise that is excluded from Article 3 because of the require-
ments of Section 3-104(a) may nevertheless be similar to a negotiable instru-
ment in many respects. Although such a writing cannot be made a
negotiable instrument within Article 3 by contract or conduct of its parties,
nothing in Section 3-104 or in Section 3-102 is intended to mean that in a
particular case involving such a writing a court could not arrive at a result
similar to the result that would follow if the writing were a negotiable instru-
ment .... [I]t may be appropriate, consistent with the principles stated in
Section 1-102(2), for a court to apply one or more provisions of Article 3 to
the writing by analogy, taking into account the expectations of the parties
and the differences between the writing and an instrument governed by Arti-
cle 3. Whether such application is appropriate depends upon the facts of
each case.
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.104 (West Supp. 2011).




period stated in the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code for actions
on a debt.83 The note provided that additional advances could be made
on the note "in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Loan
Agreement, reference to same being here made for all purposes. '84 The
Houston Court of Appeals held that this language made the promise to
pay one that was conditioned by the terms of the loan agreement and,
therefore, the instrument was non-negotiable and subject to the four-year
limitations period.85 Because suit was brought more than four years after
issuance, an action to recover on the note was barred.8 6 A declaratory
judgment entered by the trial court in favor of the guarantors who had
intervened in the action to assert the statutory limitations defense was
affirmed.87
B. TRANSFER AND ENFORCEMENT OF INSTRUMENTS
In Rosero v. Fuentes,88 a note was made payable in the form, "Pay...
to the order of [A or B or C] (collectively 'Payee')... ",89 In an action
brought against the maker by one of the payees, the maker contended
that all of the payees were necessary parties, and without their joinder the
action could not proceed. Referring to section 3.110 of the Code and to
the decision in Allied Capital Partners v. Bank One,90 the Federal District
Court for the Southern District of Texas held that a note payable in this
form was payable in the alternative and could be transferred or enforced
by any one of the payees. 9' Joinder of all payees was, therefore, not re-
quired. The court also pointed out that the parenthetical reference stat-
ing, "(collectively 'Payee')," was ambiguous and would not change the
result under the provisions of section 3.110.92
The defendant maker also contended that the parties had a contempo-
raneous oral agreement that the note was payable only if one of the
83. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.104(a) (West Supp. 2011); TEX. Civ. PRc.
& REM. CODE § 16.004(a)(3) (West 2002).
84. Guniganti, 346 S.W.3d at 249.
85. Id. at 249-50.
86. See id. at 247-51.
87. Id. at 253. Pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.004, the trial court also
allowed recovery of attorney's fees by the guarantors as part of its ruling on their motion
for a declaratory judgment. This ruling was also affirmed by the appellate court. See id.
88. Rosero v. Fuentes, Nos. 1-10-85, 1-10-51, 2011 WL 4017871 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 8,
2011).
89. See id. at *3.
90. Id. at *3. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.110(d) (West 2002); Allied Capi-
tal Partners, LP. v. Bank One, Texas, N.A., 68 S.W.3d 51, 53 (Tex. App-Dallas 2001, no
pet.) (an instrument payable to multiple payees separated by 'or' is payable to the payees
alternatively). Although not cited by the court, New Wave Technologies, Inc. v. Legacy
Bank of Texas, also addressed the question of ambiguity in naming the payees to an instru-
ment. New Wave Technologies, Inc. v. Legacy Bank of Teas, 281 S.W.3d 99, 102-03 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 2008, pet. denied). In New Wave, a check was made payable to A and/or B.
The court held that the check had been properly negotiated by the indorsement of only
one of the designated payees. Id. The case is discussed in more detail in John Krahmer's
article. John Krahmer, Commercial Transactions, 62 SMU L. REv. 995, 1011-12 (2009).




named payees died before the stated date of payment. Citing numerous
earlier Texas cases, the court held that Texas law routinely applies the
parol evidence rule to notes.93 Because the note was an integrated agree-
ment and the alleged oral agreement would vary its express terms, proof
of the agreement was excluded by the parol evidence rule.94
Since the economic downturn that began in 2008, mortgage defaults
have risen exponentially in the United States.95 This has led, in turn, to a
nationwide increase in the number of mortgage foreclosures and in the
number of court cases addressing various aspects of the foreclosure pro-
cess.96 The legal issues involved in a foreclosure proceeding often involve
an interplay between state real property law, foreclosure procedures, and
the Code. This interplay caused the Permanent Editorial Board for the
Uniform Commercial Code to issue a report on the "Application of the
Uniform Commercial Code to Selected Issues Relating to Mortgage
Notes. ' 97 The news release announcing the availability of the report
states that it addresses four questions:
To whom is the obligation to pay a mortgage note owed?
What steps must be taken for the owner of a mortgage note to
transfer ownership of the note to another person or use the note as
collateral for an obligation?
What actions may a person to whom an interest in a mortgage note
has been transferred, but who has not taken a recordable assignment
93. Id. at *5. The cases cited by the court included DeClaire v. G & B McIntosh
Family Ltd. P'ship, 260 S.W.3d 34 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.), Simmons
v. Compania Financiera Libano, S.A., 830 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.]
1992, writ denied), and Tex. Export Dev. Corp. v. Schleder, 519 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1974, no writ). DeClaire is discussed in Krahmer, supra note 90, at 1007.
94. Rosero, 2011 WL 4017871, at *6.
95. News reports on television, in newspapers, and on the internet abound. See e.g.,
Mortgage Originations and Delinquency and Foreclosure Rates 1990 to 2010, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012tables/12s1l94.pdf (last visited
Feb. 8, 2012); Mortgage Data Help Paint Foreclosure Picture, FED. RES. BANK OF DALLAS,
http://dallasfed.org/ca/epersp/2008/1-2.cfm (last visited Feb. 8, 2012); Are Foreclosures
Contagious?, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/cfr/2011/wp2Oll/CFRWP 2011_
04.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2012).
96. See, e.g., Mary Shanklin, 3 days, 300 Foreclosure Cases, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan.
16, 2012, at Al.
97. The introduction to this report states:
The Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code has pre-
pared this Report in order to further the understanding of this statutory
background by identifying and explaining several key rules in the UCC that
govern the transfer and enforcement of notes secured by a mortgage on real
property. The UCC, of course, does not resolve all issues in this field. Most
particularly, as to both substance and procedure, the enforcement of real es-
tate mortgages by foreclosure is primarily the province of a state's real prop-
erty law (although determinations made pursuant to the UCC are typically
relevant under that law). Accordingly, this Report should be understood as
providing guidance only as to the issues the Report addresses. (footnotes
omitted).
Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, Application of the Uniform
Commercial Code to Selected Issues Relating to Mortgage Notes, AM. L. INST. (Nov. 14,
2011), http://www.ali.org/00021333/PEB %20Report %20-%20November %202011.pdf.
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of the mortgage, take in order to become the assignee of record of
the mortgage securing the note?98
One of the issues that must be determined in a foreclosure proceeding
is whether the foreclosing party is the person entitled to foreclose. This
determination will depend, in part, on whether the foreclosure is a judi-
cial foreclosure or a non-judicial foreclosure. In a judicial foreclosure,
proof that the foreclosing party is a holder or owner of the note will be
necessary. 99 Sections 3.301 and 3.309 provide the rules for deciding this
issue.100 In the case of a non-judicial foreclosure, proof of holding or
ownership is not required under Texas law, but may become an issue if
the foreclosure is challenged. 1 1 In Falk v. Wells Fargo Bank'02 and Wells
v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P.,10 3 the mortgagors sued in state
court to contest the non-judicial foreclosures of their homes. The cases
were removed to federal court. In both cases, the federal district courts
held that the foreclosing parties were entitled to foreclose as assignees of
rights under the deeds of trust and were not required to be holders of the
note to foreclose their liens. 10 4 The opinion in Wells contains a particu-
larly helpful discussion of the reasons why production of the note is not
required for the non-judicial foreclosure of a lien. 105
In DeFrancheschi v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 10 6 and Bittinger v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A.,'10 7 the homeowners also challenged non-judicial fore-
closures on their homes. In DeFrancheschi, the Federal District Court for
the Northern District of Texas held that the foreclosing party was the
holder of the note and the assignee of the deed of trust and was therefore
entitled to foreclose. 10 8 In Bittinger, the Federal District Court for the
Southern District of Texas discussed sections 3.301 and 3.309 of the Code
98. See REPORT Now AVAILABLE ANALYZING THE APPLICATION OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE TO SELECTED ISSUES RELATING TO MORTGAGE NOTES, http://www.
nccusl.org/NewsDetail.aspx?title=PEB/UCC%2OReport%2ONow%20Available (last vis-
ited Feb. 8, 2012).
99. The Texas Business and Commerce Code provides that three classes of persons are
entitled to enforce an instrument: (1) the holder of the instrument, (2) a nonholder who
has the rights of a holder and who has possession of the instrument, and (3) a person not in
possession who is entitled to enforce the instrument under §§ 3.309 or 3.418(d). TEX. Bus.
& COM. CODE ANN. § 3.301 (West 2002). Section 3.309 deals with situations in which a
person seeks to enforce an instrument that has been lost or stolen. Id. § 3.309 (West Supp.
2011). The Texas Business and Commerce Code Section 3.418 involves recovery of pay-
ments by a payor or acceptor and would not generally apply to foreclosures. Id. § 3.418(d)
(West 2002).
100. Id. §§ 3.301, 3.309, 3.418.
101. Texas Property Code permits non-judicial foreclosures. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§§ 51.0001, 52.002 (West Supp. 2011).
102. Falk v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 3:09-CV-678-B, 2011 WL 3702666 (N.D. Tex. Aug.
19, 2011).
103. Wells v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., No. W-10-CA-00350, 2011 WL 2163987
(W.D. Tex. April 26, 2011).
104. Wells, 2011 WL 2163987, at *2-3; Falk, 2011 WL 3702666, at *6.
105. See Wells, 2011 WL 2163987, at *2-3.
106. DeFrancheschi v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 837 F.Supp.2d 616 (N.D. Tex. 2011).
107. Bittinger v. Wells Fargo Bank NA, No. H-10-1745, 2011 WL 5415664 (S.D. Tex.
Nov. 8, 2011).
108. DeFrancheschi, 837 F.Supp.2d at 623.
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at some length and concluded that the foreclosure could be conducted
under the provisions of section 3.301 because the foreclosing parties
could proceed as either the holder or owner of the note.10 9 A somewhat
different situation arose in Norwood v. Chase Home Finance LLC, where
the homeowner challenged a foreclosure by a loan servicer. 110 The ser-
vicer moved for summary judgment and argued that it was "exempt"
from showing possession of the note.' The case was referred to a magis-
trate judge in the Western District of Texas who recommended that sum-
mary judgment be denied because the servicer failed to show who
possessed the note or an assignment of the right to foreclose by the pos-
sessor of the note. 112
These cases, which illustrate the interplay between Texas property law,
foreclosure procedure, and the Code, are only the tip of the iceberg in
terms of the complexity and costs involved in effecting a foreclosure.
One author has suggested that the development of a secondary mortgage
market and the securitization of mortgages has rendered the concept of
negotiability obsolete and that a different legal framework should be es-
tablished to facilitate a more efficient way of proving ownership to avoid
the costs inherent in the present foreclosure system.'1 3 Whether such a
framework will eventually be established remains to be seen, but in the
meantime, disputes about "robo-signing" and inadequate documentation
about the transfer of notes and mortgages in the secondary mortgage
market continue with economic consequences for both individuals and
for the economy as a whole. 114
C. CONVERSION OF INSTRUMENTS
In Jones v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., the authorized agent of a bank
customer asked the bank to issue a cashier's check payable to four named
individuals.1 15 Later that same day, the agent returned to the bank and
deposited the check into an unrelated corporate account that had been
established by the agent and on which the agent was the only signatory.
None of the payees had ever obtained possession of the check nor had
109. Bittinger, 2011 WL 5415664, at *7-9.
110. Norwood v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, No. A-09-CA-940-JRN, 2011 WL 197874, at
*1 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2011).
111. Id. at *2.
112. Id. at *4-5.
113. See Dale A. Whitman, How Negotiability has Fouled Up the Secondary Mortgage
Market, and What to Do About It, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 737, 766-69 (2010). See also Dale A.
Whitman, The PEB Report on Mortgage Notes, AM. B. ASS'N., http://www.americanbar.
org/content/dam/aba/publications/rpte-ereport/201 1/Dec_2011/rp-whitman.authcheckdam.
pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2012).
114. A search on Google for "robo-signing" will display a multitude of hits, including
pending legal actions and settlement discussions between state and federal authorities.
See, e.g., Nick Timiraos, Dan Fitzpatrick and Ruth Simon, U.S. Pushes Mortgage Deal,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 24, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487038420045761
62813248586844.html.
115. Jones v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 3:09-CV-1989-L, 2011 WL 710877, at *1
(N.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2011).
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any of them indorsed the check. When the bank customer learned about
the agent's actions, the customer sued the bank for conversion and
breach of contract.
The Federal District Court for the Northern District of Texas reasoned
that the agent was not a person "entitled to enforce" the cashier's check
under section 3.301 of the Code but was, instead, a "remitter" as defined
in section 3.103(a)(11). 116 Because the check was payable to the named
payees and not to the agent, the bank's failure to obtain the payees' in-
dorsements rendered the bank liable for conversion under section
3.420.117 On this point, the court noted that proper banking practice re-
quired the bank to cancel the cashier's check and issue a new cashier's
check payable to the corporation into whose account the check was to be
deposited. 118 The court rejected expert testimony that the bank's failure
to proceed in this manner was a "minor oversight" or a "'clerical er-
ror'." 119 The court also rejected an argument that, as a remitter, the
plaintiff had given up ownership of the check by the action of its agent in
depositing the check into an account controlled by the agent because this
action was adverse to the interests of the principal and should not be
imputed to the principal.' 20
Because the court had determined that the plaintiff was entitled to re-
cover as a matter of law on its conversion claim, it was unnecessary to
address the contract claim.121 Determining that the contract claim was
moot, however, also meant that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover
attorney's fees under the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. 122
D. PAYMENT BY MISTAKE
In Manley v. Wachovia Small Business Capital, a bank sued the maker
of a note to recover the unpaid balance. 123 At trial, the maker testified
that he had paid the bank by delivering $375,000 in cash to one of its
branches. At that time, the maker allegedly asked for a receipt and was
told that one would be mailed to him. The maker never received a re-
ceipt, but he did receive the original note. The note had been stamped,
"PAID" on October 18, 2006. The original note, as stamped and re-
116. Id. at *3.
117. Id. at *4.
118. Id. at *5.
119. The court characterized the bank's actions as a "critical omission" because,
"[s]imply depositing the cashier's check into [an account] while skipping that vital step was
unacceptable, commercially unreasonable, and amounted to conversion under the UCC.
[The bank] was unable to produce any bank policies or procedures that authorized its
deposit of the cashier's check into the [corporate] account without first requiring a proper
indorsement from the named payees." Id. at *5.
120. Id. at *6.
121. Id.
122. Id. Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code allows recovery of attorney's fees in
any action founded on contract. TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001 (West
2008).




turned, was admitted into evidence. The bank introduced evidence that it
had an audit procedure which it followed when a note was paid and there
was no record of this procedure in the loan file. One of the bank's assis-
tant vice presidents testified that he had no idea how the note had been
stamped "PAID" and sent to the maker.
The jury was given an instruction tracking the language of section 3.604
and found that the maker had not paid any money to the bank and re-
mained liable on the note. 124 The maker appealed on the ground that
stamping the note "PAID" discharged his liability as a matter of law. The
Dallas Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that section 3.604 of the Code
clearly requires discharge to be by an intentional, voluntary act. 125 Be-
cause there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the jury's
determination that payment had not been paid, the mistaken stamping of
the note did not discharge the maker's liability.126
The maker also made an ingenious argument that the bank was not the
holder of the note because he, not the bank, had physical possession of
the note, and the note had been neither lost nor stolen. The bank, there-
fore, was not a "person entitled to enforce" the note as defined in section
3.301.127 Although nothing in the Code directly addressed this peculiar
situation, the court rejected the maker's argument and held that the Code
could be supplemented by the common law of mistake to avoid an inequi-
table result. 128
V. SECURED TRANSACTIONS
A. SCOPE OF CHAPTER 9
The primary focus of Chapter 9 is on consensual security interests cre-
ated in personal property and fixtures.12 9 "Fixtures" are defined as
124. Id. Section 3.604 of Texas Business and Commerce Code provides:
(a) A person entitled to enforce an instrument, with or without considera-
tion, may discharge the obligation of a party to pay the instrument:
(1) by an intentional voluntary act, such as surrender of the instrument
to the party, destruction, mutilation, or cancellation of the instrument,
cancellation or striking out of the party's signature, or the addition of
words to the instrument indicating discharge; or
(2) by agreeing not to sue or otherwise renouncing rights against the
party by a signed record.
TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 3.604 (West Supp. 2011).
125. Manley, 349 S.W.3d at 238.
126. Id.
127. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.301 (West 2002) is described supra note 99.
128. Manley, 349 S.W.3d at 240. Texas Business and Commerce Code provides that
other law may be used to supplement the Code unless displaced by "particular provisions"
of the Code. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.103(b) (West 2009). An excellent discus-
sion of displacement by a particular provision of the Code appears in Southwest Bank v.
Information Support Concepts, Inc. Sw. Bank v. Info. Support Concepts, Inc., 149 S.W.3d
104, 108-09 (Tex. 2004) (noting that application of the proportionate responsibility rules in
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.004 to allow joinder of responsible third parties would
disrupt the comparative fault rules in Chapter 3 of the Code).
129. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.109(a) (West Supp. 2011). Chapter 9 also
applies to other transactions that may be difficult to distinguish from a security interest or
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"goods that have become so related to particular real property that an
interest in them arises under the real property law of the state in which
the real property is situated.' 130 The difficulty in applying this definition
was nicely illustrated in 21st Mortgage Corp. v. Stovall, where the collat-
eral was variously described by the parties as a "modular home" or as a
"manufactured home.' 13 1 Regardless of the terminology used, the Dallas
Court of Appeals held that the critical issue was whether, after affixation
to the real property, the collateral retained its character as personal prop-
erty that would allow the secured party to repossess the collateral after
default.132 The court ruled that the trial court had erred in granting sum-
mary judgment to the landowners because genuine issues of material fact
existed as to whether the home had lost its character as personal
property.133
One scope issue that has apparently been concluded with a whimper
instead of a bang is the extent to which a secured party can assert a
purchase money security interest when funds are advanced to pay off a
debtor's "negative equity" in a used vehicle when that vehicle is traded in
on the purchase of a new vehicle. The issue arises because of an ambigu-
ity that exists in the "hanging paragraph" appearing in section 1325(a) of
the Bankruptcy Code.134 After a number of lower courts reached differ-
ing results about the interpretation and application of the provision, the
issue seemed to be moot when eight federal circuit courts agreed that
negative equity should be included as part of the value given by a secured
party in financing the purchase of a new vehicle. 35 However, after a
where public filing is helpful in documenting transactions to alert third parties to the exis-
tence of another person's claim to personal property. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 9.109(a)(2)-(5) (West Supp. 2011) (extending the scope of Chapter 9 to agricultural liens,
sales of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, promissory notes, consignments, and
non-consensual security interests arising under other chapters of the Code).
130. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.102(a)(41) (West Supp. 2011).
131. 21st Mortgage Corp., Inc. v. Stovall, No. 05-09-01416-CV, 2011 WL 3307516, at
*1-2 (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 3, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.).
132. Id. at *5.
133. Id. at *7. The secured party asserted that four fact issues existed that precluded
summary judgment: (1) the home was easily removable; (2) the home was a trade fixture;
(3) the lease under which the debtor-tenant had acquired the home allowed removal; and
(4) recording with the county clerk and filing a UCC financing statement gave the secured
party a right to recover the home or enforce a lien against the realty. Id. at *3.
134. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)* (2006). This provision was added to the Bankruptcy Code by
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-8, § 306, 119 Stat. 23, 80 (2005) but without a section designation. The "hanging para-
graph" has been described as having "no alphanumeric designation and merely dangles at
the end of [11 U.S.C.] § 1325(a). There is no way to cite to this provision other than its
proximity to other citable provisions." Dianne C. Kerns, Cram-a-lot: The Quest Continues,
AM. BANKR. INST. J., Nov. 2005, at 10.
135. See Nuvell Credit Corp. v. Westfall (In re Westfall), 599 F.3d 498 (6th Cir. 2010); In
re Howard, 597 F.3d 852 (7th Cir. 2010); Peaslee v. GMAC (In re Peaslee), LLC, 585 F.3d
53 (2d Cir. 2009); In re Price, 562 F.3d 618 (4th Cir. 2009); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Dale,
582 F.3d 568 (5th Cir. 2009); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Mierkowski (In re Mierkowski), 580
F.3d 740 (8th Cir. 2009); Nuvell Credit Co., LLC v. Callicott (In re Dale), 580 F.3d 753 (8th
Cir. 2009); Ford v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In re Ford), 574 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2009);
Graupner v. Nuvell Credit Corp. (In re Graupner), 537 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2008).
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contrary result reached by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in In re
Penrod created a split between the circuits, the issue appeared to be
headed toward final resolution by the United States Supreme Court. 136
Surprisingly, the Supreme Court declined to hear the case and the split
among the circuits remains unresolved. 137
B. PERFECTION OF SECURITY INTERESTS
"Perfection" is necessary to give a security interest priority against the
claims of a variety of third parties. 138 The term means that the secured
party has taken any necessary steps to protect the security interest against
third party claims. 139 The general rule contained in section 9.310 of the
Code requires the filing of a financing statement as a means of perfec-
tion.140 This rule, however, is subject to a number of exceptions. 141
In In re Willis, a secured party took a security interest in an annuity
policy as part of the collateral for a loan.142 No financing statement was
filed to perfect the security interest, but the secured party did send a no-
tice to the issuer of the annuity that the security interest had been as-
signed as collateral and, after the debtor defaulted, sent a letter to the
issuer demanding possession of the annuity.1 43 Ninety days later, the
debtor filed for bankruptcy. 144 The trustee in bankruptcy sought to avoid
the security interest as a preferential transfer. The issue before the court
was whether the secured party had perfected its security interest before
the ninety-day preference period began.1 45 The secured party resisted
avoidance on the ground that its interest in the annuity was perfected by
sending a letter demanding possession of the collateral prior to the begin-
ning of the ninety-day preference period. The Federal District Court for
the Eastern District of Texas held that the annuity was a payment intangi-
ble in which a security interest could be perfected by filing a financing
136. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 611 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir.
2010), reh'g en banc denied, 636 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied sub nor., Amer-
iCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod, 132 S. Ct. 108 (2011).
137. In re Penrod, 132 S. Ct. at 108.
138. Absent perfection, a security interest will lose priority against various third party
claimants. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.317 (West Supp. 2011) (listing a number
of situations in which third party claims will have priority over an unperfected security
interest).
139. See id. § 9.308(a) (West 2011).
140. Id. § 9.310(a).
141. See id. § 9.310(b). The exceptions include such things as possession by the secured
party, control of accounts, attachment of a security interest to a purchase money security
interest in consumer goods, compliance with a treaty or other statute providing for a differ-
ent method of perfection, and continued perfection of a security interest in proceeds of
collateral. Id.
142. Payne v. Citibank, N.A. (In re Willis), No. 09-40756, Adv. No. 09-4163, 2011 WL
1168408, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. March 29, 2011).
143. Id. at *1-2.
144. Id. at *2.
145. Id. at *2-3. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) allows avoidance of transfers made within ninety
days prior to a bankruptcy filing. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2006). A "transfer" includes perfec-




statement as required by section 9.310(a) or which could be perfected
automatically under section 9.309(2) if the assignment did not constitute
an assignment of a "significant part" of the debtor's payment in-
tangibles. 146 Because the secured party had not filed a financing state-
ment and had introduced no evidence about the value of the annuity in
relation to the debtor's other payment intangibles, the record did not sup-
port a conclusion that the interest had been perfected outside the ninety-
day preference period. 14" The secured party also argued that payment of
the proceeds of the annuity by the issuer following entry of final judg-
ment in a state court action that the secured party had brought against
the debtor either perfected the security interest or, alternatively, divested
the debtor of any rights in the annuity and therefore no rights in the an-
nuity passed to the trustee as part of the debtor's bankruptcy estate. As
to this argument, the court pointed out that payment by an account
debtor (in this case, the issuer of the annuity) pursuant to section 9.406 of
the Code does not operate to perfect a security interest. 148 Furthermore,
in the state court action, the court did not consider the issue of perfection
because, as between the debtor and secured party, perfection was not
required to enforce the security interest against the debtor.149 Because
further proceedings were required to determine if the security interest
had been automatically perfected under section 9.309(2), the secured
party's motion for summary judgment was denied.150
Some cases never seem to die. The last Survey, in discussing the case
of In re Moye,' 5' pointed out that, when cars are held by a dealership as
inventory a financing statement must be filed to perfect a security interest
in the inventory. 52 After a car has been sold, the proper method of
perfection is by notation on the certificate of title.' 53 In In re Moye, the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision of the lower court and reiterated these
rules governing perfection of security interests in cars. 154 This ruling did
not, however, end the litigation surrounding the dealership's bankruptcy.
In two other consolidated cases arising out of the same bankruptcy, the
Federal District Court for the Southern District of Texas again discussed
and applied the rules governing the perfection of security interests in the
inventory of a car dealer. 55 As before, the court held that the physical
146. In re Willis, 2011 WL 1168408, at *3-4.
147. Id. at *4.
148. Id. at *4.
149. Id.
150. Id. at *4-5.
151. Hardy Rawls Enters. LLC v. Cage (In re Moye), No. H-09-2747, Bankr. No. 07-
37770, 2010 WL 3259386 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2010).
152. See Krahmer, supra note 5, at 168. The rule requiring filing of a financing state-
ment on a car dealer's inventory appears in Texas Business and Commerce Code. TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.311(d) (West 2011).
153. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.311(a)(2) (West 2011). See also Krahmer,
supra note 5, at 168.
154. Moye v. Cage (In re Moye), 437 F. App'x 338, 342-43 (5th Cir. 2011).




possession of car titles by the secured parties did not perfect a security
interest in the cars, but did find in favor of one of the secured parties who
had filed a financing statement.156 This decision was still not the end of
the saga of Moye. In Moye v. Cage, the trustee moved for sanctions
against the attorneys who had represented one of the secured parties in
earlier proceedings for filing a proof of claim based on the allegedly per-
fected security interest.157 The bankruptcy court granted the motion, and
the attorneys took an interlocutory appeal to the District Court for the
Southern District of Texas. 158 The trustee moved to dismiss the appeal
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the motion was granted.' 59
While much of the opinion discusses the jurisdictional issue, it is worthy
to note that, in dicta, the court opined that even if the appeal were
granted, it would fail on the merits because there was no basis on which
the secured parties could assert that the security interests claimed in the
vehicles were perfected by possession or assignment of the certificates of
title.160
C. PRIORITIES
When Texas adopted the revision of Chapter 9 in 1999, section 9.406 of
the Code contained a provision allowing the assignment of security inter-
ests in accounts even if assignment was otherwise prohibited by another
law. 161 In Texas Lottery Commission v. First State Bank of DeQueen,162
the Texas Supreme Court held that this provision allowed the assignment
of lottery winnings despite a conflict with the Texas Lottery Act prohibit-
ing assignment of lottery winnings.t 63 In Great-West Life & Annuity In-
surance Co. v. Texas Attorney General Child Support Division,164 the
Austin Court of Appeals, applying the reasoning of the Texas Supreme
Court in DeQueen, held that section 9.406 allowed the assignment of lot-
tery winnings despite a prohibition on the assignment of winnings when
156. Id. at *7-10.
157. Moye v. Cage, No. H-10-4531, 2011 WL 3444221, at *1-2 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 8,2011).
158. Id. at *2-3.
159. Id. at *5.
160. Id. at *4. The lesson in this decision seems clear. A secured party's attorney runs
the risk of sanctions for filing a proof of claim when the Code rules are clear and leave no
room for even a colorable argument about whether a security interest was or was not prop-
erly perfected. See id.
161. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.406(f) (West Supp. 2011) (providing that
accounts are assignable despite the existence of a "rule of law, statute, or regulation that
prohibits, restricts, or requires the consent of the government, governmental body or offi-
cial."). Texas Business and Commerce Code provides that "accounts" include "winnings in
a lottery or other game of chance operated or sponsored by a state, governmental unit of a
state, or person licensed or authorized to operate the game by a state or governmental unit
of a state." TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.102(a)(2)(viii) (West 2011).
162. Tex. Lottery Comm'n v. First State Bank of DeQueen, 325 S.W.3d 628 (Tex. 2010).
163. Id. at 631. The conflicting provisions in the Lottery Act appeared in Tex. Gov't.
Code Ann. §§ 466.406 and 466.410. Id. at 633.
164. Great W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Tex. Att'y Gen. Child Support Div., 331
S.W.3d 884 (Tex. App.-Austin 2011, pet. denied).
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the winner was subject to an order of child support. 165 The Lottery Act
has since been amended to make section 9.406 subject to the child sup-
port provisions of the Lottery Act. 166
D. ENFORCEMENT OF SECURITY INTERESTS FOLLOWING DEFAULT
After a default has occurred, Chapter 9 gives a variety of remedies to a
secured party. These remedies include repossession, acceptance of the
collateral in full or partial satisfaction of the debt, sale of the collateral,
and a right to sue for any deficiency. 167 All of these remedies include a
number of procedural safeguards to protect the rights of a debtor after a
default. 168 The first issue to consider, however, is whether these rights
and remedies have been triggered by a default. In SLT Dealer Group,
Ltd. v. AmeriCredit Financial Services, a secured party financed the oper-
ation of a car dealer.169 The financing agreement required the dealer to
perfect security interests in any vehicles sold by the dealer before as-
signing the retail installment sales contracts to the secured party.170 The
dealer sold a vehicle without complying with this requirement. The vehi-
cle was subsequently damaged in an accident, and a mechanic's lien was
placed on the vehicle to secure the cost of repairs. The secured party
demanded that the dealer repurchase this contract because of the dealer's
165. Id. at 899.
166. See Act of May 23, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 403, § 5, 2011 Tex. Sess. Law. Serv.
403 (West) (current version at TEX. GOV'T. CODE ANN. § 466.410 (West Supp. 2011)).
Unfortunately, this amendment may not entirely resolve the statutory conflict because, in
the same legislative session, Section 9.406 of Texas Business and Commerce Code was also
amended to provide,
[an assignment under this section is subject to Section 466.410, Government
Code, except to the extent that Section 466.410(a), Government Code, pro-
hibits the assignment of installment prize payments due within the final two
years of the prize payment schedule, in which case this section shall prevail
over Section 466.410 solely to the extent necessary to permit such
assignment.
See Uniform Law on Secured Transactions, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 67, § 9, 2011 Tex. Sess.
Law. Serv. 403 (West) (to be codified as an amendment to Tex. Bus. & Com. Code
§ 9.406). Because of the difference in the effective dates, no litigation about this potential
statutory conflict can arise until after July 1, 2013.
167. See generally TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.601, 9.609 (right to repossess),
9.610 (right to dispose of collateral by sale, lease, etc.), 9.620 (right to retain collateral in
full or partial satisfaction), and 9.626 (action for deficiency) (West 2011). For a detailed
discussion of the rights of a secured party following default, see Timothy Zinnecker's arti-
cle. Timothy R. Zinnecker, The Default Provisions of Revised Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code: Part I:, 54 Bus. LAW. 1113 (1999) and Timothy R. Zinnecker, The De-
fault Provisions of Revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Part I:, 54 Bus.
LAW. 1737 (1999), also published as Timothy R. Zinnecker, THE DEFAULT PROVISIONS OF
REVISED ARTICLE 9 (1999).
168. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.602 (non-waivable rights of debtor),
9.610 (disposition after default must be commercially reasonable), 9.611-.614 (notices re-
quired before disposition), 9.625 (remedies for secured party's failure to comply with de-
fault provisions) (West 2011).
169. SLT Dealer Grp., Ltd. v. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., 336 S.W.3d 822 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.).
170. In Code terms, such contracts are termed "chattel paper." See TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 9.102(a)(11) (West Supp. 2011).
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failure to perfect a security interest in the vehicle, and the dealer refused.
The secured party also discovered that the dealer had sold three other
vehicles without perfecting security interests in them before assignment
of the sales contracts. The secured party sued for breach of contract. 171
The dealer defended on the theory that the secured party had failed to
comply with the duty to dispose of collateral in a commercially reasona-
ble manner when it failed to repossess and resell the vehicles. The Hous-
ton First Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the dealer's own
actions prevented the secured party from perfecting security interests in
the vehicles.' 7 2 Under these circumstances, the duty of the secured party
to repossess the vehicles was never triggered and there was therefore no
obligation on the part of the secured party to dispose of collateral that
had never been repossessed.17 3 The judgment of the trial court in favor
of the secured party for breach of contract was affirmed.174
In People's United Equipment Finance Corp. v. Halls, the secured party
did repossess and resell collateral consisting of equipment financed by a
loan from the secured party.'7 5 After the debtor filed for bankruptcy, the
secured party sued four guarantors for the resulting deficiency. The guar-
antors contested the commercial reasonableness of the resale. The se-
cured party introduced expert testimony showing that it had given proper
notice of disposition and had conducted the sale in a manner conforming
with a commercially reasonable disposition of collateral of this kind.176
The Federal District Court for the Southern District of Texas held that
the guarantors were liable under their guaranty agreements and that the
sale of the collateral was commercially reasonable.' 77
In Morales v. JP Morgan Chase Bank,17 8 the debtor sued for a defi-
ciency following the repossession and resale of a motor vehicle. In this
case, however, in response to the secured party's motion for summary
judgment, the debtor alleged that he did not recall receiving a notice of
disposition from the secured party. The Houston First District Court of
Appeals held that this allegation was not sufficient to place the issue of
commercially reasonable disposition in issue and would not defeat the
motion for summary judgment. 179
171. SLT Dealer Grp., 336 S.W.3d at 825-26.
172. Id. at 830-31.
173. Id. at 829.
174. Id. at 833.
175. People's United Equip. Fin. Corp. v. Halls, No. H-10-2016, 2011 WL 1831606, at *4
(S.D. Tex. May 12, 2011).
176. Id. at *4-6.
177. Id. at *6.
178. Morales v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, No. 01-10-00553-CV, 2011 WL 2624047 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] June 30, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.).
179. Id. at *6. Once placed in issue, the secured party has the burden of establishing
that a disposition was conducted in a commercially reasonable manner. See TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 9.626 (West 2011). The court apparently reasoned that a mere state-
ment that the debtor did not remember receiving a notice was not sufficiently definite to
place a burden on the secured party to prove that notice had been sent. See Morales, 2011
WL 2624047, at *6. Under TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.611 (West 2011), a secured
party need only prove that notice was properly sent and need not prove that it was re-
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In Captran/Tanglewood LLC v. Thomas N. Thurlow & Associates, 80
the dispute centered on whether the secured party could recover attor-
ney's fees under section 38.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code following the assignment of accounts to the secured party in an
action seeking recovery from the account debtor on unpaid accounts.' 8 '
The Federal District Court for the Southern District of Texas held that
the secured party's action was not a claim founded on contract as re-
quired by section 38.001, but was instead an action governed by the
Code.182 Under these circumstances, the court held it was clear that sec-
tion 9.607 of the Code requires a secured party to deduct attorney's fees
instead of adding them to the proceeds recovered from the account
debtor.183
Under section 9.620 of the Code, a secured party may elect to retain
collateral in full or partial satisfaction of the secured debt.184 In Smith v.
Community National Bank, following the bankruptcy of the principal
debtor, a secured party and the guarantor of the secured debt entered
into an agreed order allowing assignment to the secured party of the col-
lateral and the proceeds of an insurance claim for damage to the collat-
eral.185 The secured party sold the collateral and also sued the guarantor
for a deficiency. The trial court entered judgment against the guaran-
tor. 8 6 The guarantor appealed on the ground that the assignment of the
collateral to the secured party was an acceptance in full or partial satisfac-
tion of the debt. The secured party argued that the guarantor had waived
any defenses relating to the disposition of collateral under the terms of
the guaranty agreement. On this issue, however, the Eastland Court of
Appeals disagreed with the secured party because section 9.602 of the
Code prohibits such waivers.' 87 Because the waiver was ineffective, the
guarantor was entitled to raise the issue of whether the collateral had
been accepted in full or partial satisfaction of the debt.1 88 Although the
guarantor could raise this issue, the effort ultimately proved unavailing
because, in reviewing the procedural requirements surrounding accept-
ceived. "Send" is defined in Texas Business and Commerce Code. TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 1.201(b)(36) (West 2009). The term includes deposit in the mail with a
proper address and postage or transmission costs or by transmission by other means which
cause the notice to be "received ... within the time at which it would have arrived if
properly sent." Id. The result in Morales may have been different if the debtor had denied
receiving notice instead of failing to remember if notice was received.
180. Captran/Tanglewood LLC v. Thomas N. Thurlow & Assocs., No. H-08-2374, 2011
WL 2969835 (S.D. Tex. July 21, 2011).
181. Id. at *1-2.
182. Id. at *2-3.
183. Id. at *4 (referring to and applying TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE § 9.607(c)).
184. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.620 (West 2011).
185. Smith v. Cmty Nat'l Bank, 344 S.W.3d 561 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2011, pet.
denied).
186. Id. at 563.
187. Id. at 568 (citing and applying TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE § 9.602(10) and referring
to the rules stated in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE §§ 9.620-.622 which provide protection to
debtors and secondary obligors).
188. Id. at 568-69.
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ance of collateral in satisfaction of a debt, the court held that the agreed
order contained nothing to indicate the collateral had been assigned to
the secured party to satisfy the debt, nor had the actions of the secured
party amounted to a strict foreclosure of the collateral. 189 The judgment
of the trial court was affirmed on the substantive issues of waiver and
acceptance in satisfaction of the debt, but reversed and remanded for re-
calculation of the damages to credit the guarantor with the amounts re-
ceived by the secured party in the form of insurance proceeds resulting
from damage to the collateral and for the amount received by the secured
party from sale of the collateral.190
E. THE 2011 LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS OF CHAPTER 9
Sixteen sections of Chapter 9 were amended during the 2011 Texas leg-
islative session.191 Many of the amendments represent clarifications or
minor changes, but a few of them deserve particular comment.
Section 9.102(a) was amended by adding a definition of the term "Pub-
lic Organic Record.' 92 This change was required because of the exten-
sive amendment of section 9.503 dealing with naming the debtor on a
189. Id at 568-69, 572-74. On the latter point, the court noted that Texas Business and
Commerce Code Section 9.620 was intended to abolish the doctrine of constructive strict
foreclosure. Id. at 572-73.
190. Id. at 575.
191. The following sections of the Code were amended by Uniform Law on Secured
Transactions, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 67, §§ 1-20, 2011 Tex. Sess. Law. Serv. ch. 67 (West) (to
be codified as an amendment to Tex. Bus. & Com. Code ch. 9) (eff. July 1, 2013):
§ 9.102 Definitions of "Authenticate," "Certificate of Title," "Jurisdiction of Organiza-
tion," and "Registered Organization" were amended in §§ (7), (10), (50) and (71), respec-
tively and a definition of "Public Organic Record" was added as § 9.102(a)(68-a);
§ 9.105 Control of Electronic Chattel Paper;
§ 9.307 Location of Debtor;
§ 9.311 Perfection of Security Interests in Property Subject to Certain Statutes, Regula-
tions, and Treaties;
§ 9.316 Effect of Change in Governing Law;
§ 9.317 Interests that Take Priority Over or Take Free of Security Interest or Agricultural
Lien;
§ 9.326 Priority of Security Interests Created by New Debtor;
§ 9.406 Discharge of Account Debtor; Notification of Assignment; Identification and Proof
of Assignment; Restrictions on Assignment of Accounts, Chattel Paper, Payment In-
tangibles, and Promissory Notes Ineffective;
§ 9.408 Restrictions on Assignment of Promissory Notes, Health-Care-Insurance Receiv-
ables, and Certain General Intangibles Ineffective;
§ 9.502 Contents of Financing Statement; Record of Mortgage as Financing Statement;
Time of Filing Financing Statement;
§ 9.503 Name of Debtor and Secured Party;
§ 9.507 Effect of Certain Events on Effectiveness of Financing Statement;
§ 9.515 Duration and Effectiveness of Financing Statement; Effect of Lapsed Financing
Statement;
§ 9.516 What Constitutes Filing; Effectiveness of Filing;
§ 9.518 Claim Concerning Inaccurate or Wrongfully Filed Record; and
§ 9.607 Collection and Enforcement by Secured Party;
In addition to these amendments, §§ 9.801-809 were added to the Code as transition pro-
visions. Id. § 18.
192. Id. § 1.
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financing statement. 193 As amended, section 9.503 will require that in the
case of registered organizations, the name of the debtor be shown on the
public organic record in the state in which the debtor is organized.' 94
This change is intended to make it clear that a specific record must be
used to determine the names of debtors established as registered organi-
zations and that other public records, such as certificates of good standing
or assumed name filings, will not suffice as the name of the debtor on a
financing statement. 195 The definition includes trusts that are formed as
registered organizations, such as business trusts. 196 Section 9.503 was also
amended to provide "safe harbors" for use in filing financing statements
against individuals, a subject that has caused considerable difficulty under
the existing version of the Code. 197 The amended version of section 9.503
parallels a non-uniform change made to this section in 2007 concerning
the use of a debtor's name appearing on a driver's license as a safe harbor
for filing a financing statement. 198
The definition of "certificate of title" in section 9.102(a)(10) was
amended to accommodate developing systems that provide for electronic
issuance and notation of liens on certificates of title. 199
Section 9.105 was amended to accommodate technological changes in
the control of electronic chattel paper. The current version of this section
contains a six-factor test for control.200 The amended version retains this
test, but also allows use of any system that provides a reliable method of
control that would not satisfy the stated test.20l
193. See id. at § 12.
194. See id.
195. This change will not, of course, solve the problem if a secured party files a financ-
ing statement that fails to properly state the name of a debtor as shown in the public
organic record. See, e.g., In re Jim Ross Tires, Inc., 379 B.R. 670, 673-78 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
2007) (where one of the filings in question added a dba name to the name of debtor and
the other filing in question failed to include the letter "s" in the word "Tires."). The court
held that neither filing correctly provided the name of the debtor as required by Section
9.503 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code. Id. at 680.
196. Uniform Law on Secured Transactions, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 67, § 12, 2011 Tex.
Sess. Law. Serv. ch. 67 (West) (to be codified as an amendment to Tex. Bus. & Com. Code
§ 9.503).
197. See id. For examples of this difficulty, see Clark v. Deere and Co. (In re
Kinderknecht), 308 B.R. 71, 76 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2004) (using nickname "Terry
Kinderknecht" incorrect where debtor's name was "Terrance Kinderknecht"); Parks v.
Berry (In re Berry), No. 05-14423, Adv. No. 05-5755, 2006 WL 3499682, at *1 (Bankr. D.
Kan. 2006) (filing in name "Mike Berry" not effective where correct name was "Michael
Berry;" Nazar v. Bucklin Nat'l Bank (In re Erwin), 50 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 933, 933
(Bankr. D. Kan. 2003) (using name "Mike Erwin" ineffective where name should have
been "Michael Erwin").
198. Act of May 17, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 565, § 1, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 1030 (cur-
rent version at TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANNm. § 9.503 (West Supp. 2011)).
199. See Uniform Law on Secured Transactions, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 67, § 1, 2011 Tex.
Sess. Law. Serv. ch. 67 (West) (to be codified as an amendment to Tex. Bus. & Com. Code
§ 9.102).
200. See TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 9.105 (West Supp. 2011).
201. See Uniform Law on Secured Transactions, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 67, § 2, 2011 Tex.




Section 9.307 was amended to clarify the location of a debtor organized
under the laws of the United States. This change was needed because
federal statutes are not consistent in terminology, e.g., sometimes refer-
ring to "main office" or "home office" as the location of a debtor. 20 2
Section 9.316 was amended to provide that a security interest will at-
tach and be perfected in new collateral acquired by a debtor after a
change of the debtor's location from one state to another state. 20 3 This
perfection will continue for four months after the change in location.20 4
This change will give greater protection to secured parties than the cur-
rent section 9.316, which only continues perfection for collateral acquired
before the change in location.205
This change in section 9.316 also required amendment of section 9.326
to make a security interest perfected under section 9.316 subordinate to a
security interest created by a new debtor.20 6
Section 9.518 was amended to allow debtors and secured parties the
right to file an "information statement" if the party believes that a filed
record is inaccurate or was wrongfully filed.20 7 This change in terminol-
ogy makes it clear that an information statement does not correct a filed
record, but only provides information to a searcher that additional in-
quiry is needed to determine rights that may exist in collateral.
Sections 9.801 through 9.809 were added as transition provisions to
continue perfection by filings made under current law and to provide
rules governing the filing of continuation statements and amendments
following July 1, 2013, when the amendments become effective. 208 As
was the case when Chapter 9 was revised in 1999, a five-year transition
period was designated to conform with the five-year effectiveness of filed
financing statements.20 9
VI. CONCLUSION
Although several interesting cases were reported during this Survey pe-
riod, there is no doubt that the amendments to Chapter 9 will have a
significant impact on secured lending when they become effective on July
1, 2013. Prior to that time, attorneys practicing in the area of commercial
law should become familiar with the amendments and with the need to
file continuation statements within the time limits provided in amended
section 9.805 in order to continue perfection of security interest perfected
202. See id. § 3.
203. See id. § 6.
204. See id.
205. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.316 (West Supp. 2011).
206. See Uniform Law on Secured Transactions, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 67, § 8, 2011 Tex.
Sess. Law. Serv. ch. 67 (West) (to be codified as an amendment to Tex. Bus. & Com. Code
§ 9.326).
207. See id. § 16.
208. See id. § 18.
209. See id. § 18; TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.515(a) (West 2011).
20121
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by filing under the current version of the Code.210
210. See Uniform Law on Secured Transactions, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 67, § 18,2011 Tex.
Sess. Law. Serv. ch. 67 (West) (to be codified as Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 9.801).
